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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETI

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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26 October 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 October 1964

DAILY BRIEF

South Vietnam: The appointment of Phan Khac Suu as chief of state will give the new government the trappings of civilian rule, but may prove only an interim arrangement.

Suu, who is 59 and apparently in poor health, reportedly told the High National Council, of which he was president, that he would agree to head the new government only until a popular assembly can be convened. Suu's choice for prime minister appears to be narrowing to three civilians, Saigon Mayor Huong, Interior Minister Vien, and Ho Van Nhut, a long-time nationalist with little government experience. The appointment of any of these men may enable the military to exercise a strong voice since Huong, like Suu, is in questionable health and Vien is Khanh's uncle.

General Minh, a principal candidate for the top post, may have been passed over because of his reluctance to resign from the armed forces. There is evidence that various political and religious leaders, particularly Catholics who strongly object to Minh, also pressed the council to name Suu, a member of the Cao Dai sect and a respected nationalist acceptable to almost all factions. 7

The problem of a compensating position for General Minh is still to be resolved. Khanh and his military backers would oppose any effort to give him a key military role.

him a key military role.

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*Rhodesia: The white-controlled Rhodesian Government seems to be moving closer to a unilateral declaration of independence, despite British efforts to block such a move.

Prime Minister Smith has refused the Wilson government's 23 October invitation for immediate talks in London, saying he could not go until after the forthcoming referendum on independence

Smith's independence program, which would perpetuate white minority rule, will be submitted to the predominantly European electorate on 5 November. Smith also is seeking some expression of African support from a special council of African chiefs and headmen. He has refused to consult African nationalist leaders.

An indication of the hard line Smith intends to follow is suggested by his dismissal on 24 October of the commander of the Rhodesian Army, who has opposed a unilateral declaration of independence.

The UK is opposed to Rhodesian independence under the present white minority rule, and has made clear publicly its objections to Smith's methods of consulting only chiefs and headmen to determine African support. The new Labor government had planned to issue Smith an ultimatum by 25 October if he refused the British invitation for further talks. It would set forth the economic sanctions that would be applied in the event of a unilateral declaration.

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The UK High Commissioner in Salisbury is of the opinion, however, that it is probably already too late to prevent a unilateral declaration.

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26 Oct 64

DAILY BRIEF

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*Sudan: The military regime's suppression of disturbances in Khartoum during the past five days has led to widespread demands for a return to civilian government.

Heads of important politico-religious groups and of other segments of the population are exploiting the unrest in calling for a "return to democracy." Work stoppages are occurring in support of these demands and a general strike is in prospect.

This pressure probably will force the regime to make some concession in the form of increased civilian participation in the government. The regime may also have to moderate its campaign against negro separatists in Sudan's southern provinces who have been in rebellion for more than a year against the Arab Moslem government.

The rioting began last week after a student was killed while police were trying to break up an unauthorized student discussion of the government's policy toward the rebels. In the subsequent riots, three other persons reportedly have been killed.

Embassies as well as government buildings are being guarded by troops, but the US Embassy reports that there has been no discernible antiforeign sentiment among the demonstrators.

Army units and the police are enforcing nightly curfews in the Khartoum area. A number of provincial military governors are said to have sent telegrams of support to President Abboud. There are no present indications of any disunity among army personnel but in the past there have been reports of dissension, and leaders of the politicoreligious sects who now are putting pressure on the regime have many followers in the army.

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NOTES

Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda is resigning his office and the presidency of the conservative ruling party because of his prolonged illness. His failure to designate Olympics Minister Ichiro Kono as acting prime minister suggests that Ikeda may give informal endorsement as his permanent successor to Kono's arch foe, Eisaku Sato. Sato, former prime minister Kishi's younger brother, has held numerous party and government posts in the past, and has been considered a logical successor to

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Ikeda.

USSR: Vladimir Stepakov has been publicly confirmed as the new chief editor of Izvestia, replacing Khrushchev's son-in-law, Aleksey Adzhubev. Stepakov is a professional party propagandist. Supporting rumors that other personnel changes are imminent, the journal Party Life in its latest editorial asserted that party organs "have the duty"

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25X1 to oppose poor leaders.

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